List of Words in Seddon's Appendix of Terms

1 ἀδιάφορος
2 ἀγαθός
3 αἰδήμων
4 ἀπαίδευτος
5 ἀπάθεια
6ἀφορμή
7 ἀποπροήμενος
8 ἀπροαίρετα
9 ἀρετή
10 ἄσκησις
11 ἀταραξία
12 βούλησις
13 χαρά
14 ἔκκλισις
15 ἐκτός
16 ἐλευθερία
17 ἐφ᾽᾽ἡμῖν
18 ἐπιθυμία
19 εὐδαίμων
20 εὐδαιμονία
21 εὐλάβεια
22 εὐπάθεια
23 εὔροια βιοῦ
24 εὐσεβής
25 ἡδονή
26 ἡγεμονικόν
27 ὁρμή
28 ὑπεξαίρεσις
29 ὑπόλειψις
30 ἰδιώτης
31 ἰδιωτισμός
32 κακία
33 καλός
34 κακός
35 κατὰ φύσιν
36 κάθηκον
37 κατόρθωμα
38 λύπη
39 ὄρεξις
40 πάθος
41 πεπρωμένη
42 φαντασία
43 φιλοσοφία
44 φιλοσοφος
45 φόβος
46 φύσις
47 πιστός
48 προήγμενος
49 προαίρεσις
50 προκοπή
51 προκόπτω
52 προκόπτων
53 σοφός
54 συγκατάθεσις
55 ταραχή
56 τέλος
57 θεός
58 τόποι
59 Ζεύς

Seddon Enchiridion Key Terms
1 ἀδιάφορος adiaphoros ‘indifferent’; the adiaphora are any of those things that are neither good nor bad, everything, in fact, that does not fall under the headings ‘virtue’ or ‘vice’. The indifferents are what those lacking Stoic wisdom frequently take to be good or bad, and hence taken to be desirable or undesirable. Pursuing them, or trying to avoid them, can lead to disturbing emotions that undermine one’s capacity to lead a eudaimôn life. [See Discourses 1.9.12–13, 1.20.12, 1.30.3, 2.5.1–7, 2.6.1–2, 2.9.15, 2.19.13; DL 7.92/102–5; Handbook 32.2; LS 58; Stob. 2.7.5a/7/7a–d/7f–g.]
2 ἀγαθός agathos ‘good’; something agathos is that which truly benefits the person who possesses it, understood by the Stoics to be ‘virtue’, to be acquired by ‘following nature’, by being motivated by the right sort of impulses and keeping one’s moral character (prohairesis) in the right condition. For Epictetus, the essence of good is the proper use of phantasiai, ‘impressions’ (Discourses 1.20.15), for this is what is eph’ hêmin, ‘in our power’ (Discourses 1.22.11–12). See also aretê, hormê, prohairesis, phusis. [See Discourses 1.25.1, 1.27.12.1.29.1–4, 1.30.1–7, 2.1.4, 2.2.5/8, 2.8.4, 2.16.1–2, 2.19.13, 3.3.24, 3.10.18, 3.20, 3.22.38–44, 3.24.3, 4.1.132–3, 4.5.32.4.10.8–9, 4.12.7–9, 4.13.24; DL 7.94–5/98–103; Handbook 6, 19.2, 24.3, 25.1, 29.7, 30, 31.2/4, 32.1; LS 60; Stob. 2.7.5a–b/5b1/5b6/5c–m/6d–f/7g/10/10b/11b–d/11f/11i.]
3 αἰδήμων aidêmôn ‘self-respecting’, of someone who possesses aidôs, self-respect, honour, a sense of modesty, or a sense of shame; for Epictetus, a key characteristic of the prokoptôn’s prohairesis. Our aidôs is our own, and cannot be taken away, nor its use prevented (Discourses 1.25.4). See also pistos. [See Discourses 1.3.4, 1.16.7, 2.1.11, 2.2.4, 2.8.23, 2.10.15/18, 2.20.32, 2.22.20/30, 3.7.27, 3.17.5, 3.18.6, 3.22.15, 4.1.106, 4.2.8, 4.3.1–2/7–9, 4.4.6, 4.5.21–2, 4.8.33, 4.9.6/9/11, 4.12.6, 4.13.19–20; Handbook 33.15, 40; Fragment 14; for aidêmôn together with pistos see Discourses 1.4.18–20, 1.25.4, 1.28.20–1/23, 2.4.2, 2.8.23, 2.10.22–3/29, 2.22.20/30, 3.3.9–10, 3.7.36, 3.13.3, 3.14.13, 3.17.3, 3.23.18, 4.1.161, 4.3.7, 4.9.17, 4.13.13/15; Handbook 24.3–5.]
4 ἀπαίδευτος apaideutos ‘uneducated’; the condition from which the Stoic prokoptôn tries to save themselves by learning Stoic principles and putting those principles into effect. See idiôtês. [See Discourses 1.8.8, 1.29.54, 3.26.28, 4.4.32; Handbook 5.]
5 ἀπάθεια apatheia ‘peace of mind’ (literally, ‘without passion’, that is, being free from passion); a constituent of the eudaimôn life. One who enjoys peace of mind is apathês. [See Discourses 1.4.3/28–9, 2.8.23, 2.17.31, 3.5.7, 3.13.11, 3.15.12, 3.21.9, 3.24.24, 3.26.13, 4.3.7, 4.4.9/36, 4.6.16/34, 4.8.27, 4.10.13/22/26; DL 7.117; Handbook 12.2, 29.7.]
6 ἀφορμή aphormê ‘repulsion’ (the opposite of hormê); that which motivates our rejection of anything. [See Discourses 1.1.12.1.4.11, 3.2.2, 3.7.26/34, 3.12.13, 3.22.31/36/43, 4.11.6/26; DL 7.105–6; Handbook 2.2; Stob. 2.7.7c/9.]
7 ἀπροπροήγμενος apoproêgmenos ‘dispreferred’; used of adiaphoros (‘indifferent’) things, including such things as sickness, physical impairment, death, pain, poverty, injustice, a ‘bad’ reputation, unpopularity, lack of practical skills, and so forth (conventionally ‘bad’ things, usually taken to disadvantage those who suffer them). Enduring any of the dispreferred indifferents does not detract from the eudaimôn life enjoyed by the Stoic sophos. See also proêgmenos. [See LS 58; Stob. 2.7.7b/7g.]
8 ἀπροαίιρετα aprohaireta ‘things independent of the moral character’. Each is aprohairetos. (Discourses 1.30.3, 2.13.10, 2.16.1; MA 6.41). See prohairesis.
9 ἀρετή aretê ‘excellence’ or ‘virtue’; in the context of Stoic ethics the possession of ‘moral excellence’ will secure eudaimonia (‘happiness’ or ‘flourishing’). For Epictetus, one acquires this by learning the correct use of impressions, following God, and following nature. The virtues are the only things that are good (agathos); they are dispositions of one’s prohairesis (moral character) that inform actions and duties generally. Four primary virtues had been recognised since the time of Plato: phronêsis (prudence or wisdom), sôphrosunê (temperance, moderation, or self-restraint), dikaiosunê (justice), and andreia (courage or bravery). The other virtues were taken to be subordinate to these four: perseverance is a type of courage, and kindness is a sort of justice, for instance (see Stob. 5b2). The term arête does not occur in the Handbook. The opposite of virtue, vice, is kakia. See kalos. [See Discourses 1.4.3–11, 1.12.16, 2.9.15, 2.19.13/17/21, 2.23.19, 3.3.22, 3.16.7, 3.22.59, 3.24.111, 4.1.164, 4.8.32; DL 7.89–94/97–8/100–2/109/125–8;Stob. 2.7.5a–b5/5b7–11/5c/5e–g/5i/5k–l/6/6d–f/8/11g–k.]
10 ἄσκεσις askêsis ‘training’, ‘exercise’ or ‘practice’ undertaken by the Stoic prokoptôn striving to become a Stoic sophos. The most important exercise for Epictetus is maintaining the correct use of impressions. (Epictetus uses the term meletaô, ‘to practise, or train oneself in something’, at Handbook 5.1.) See also phantasia. [See Discourses 2.9.13, 3.2.1, 3.10.7, 3.12; Handbook 14.1, 47; Stob. 2.7.5b4.]
11 ἀταραξία ataraxia ‘imperturbability’; literally ‘without disturbance or trouble’, translated variously as ‘peace of mind’, ‘serenity’, ‘calm’, ‘tranquillity’, or ‘impassiveness’; a state of mind that is a constituent of the eudaimôn life. Someone possessed of this state of mind is atarachos. [See Discourses 1.4.21, 2.1.21/33, 2.2, 2.5.2/7, 3.13.13, 3.15.12, 3.21.9, 3.24.79, 4.1.84, 4.4.36, 4.6.34, 4.8.27/30–1, 4.10.22, 4.11.22; Handbook 12.2, 29.7.]
12 βούλησις boulêsis ‘wish’; one of the three eupatheiai (‘good feelings’), experienced only by the Stoic wise person. Boulêsis is defined as a eulogos orexis, a ‘reasonable desire’. [See DL 7.116; Stob. 2.7.5b/9a.]
13 χαρά chara ‘joy’; one of the three eupatheiai (‘good feelings’), experienced only by the Stoic wise person. [See DL 7.94/98/116; Ep. 59; Stob. 2.7.5b/5c/5g/5k/6d.]
14 ἔκκλισις ekklisis ‘aversion’ or ‘avoidance’; opposite of orexis (desire), and along with orexis, ekklisis should be exercised ‘in accordance with nature’ (Discourses 1.21.2). [See Discourses 1.1.12, 1.4.1/11, 2.29.19, 3.2.1–3, 3.3.2, 3.6.6, 3.12, 3.14.10, 3.22.13/31/36/43, 3.23.10, 3.24.54, 3.26.14, 4.4.28/33, 4.5.27, 4.6.18, 4.8.20, 4.10.4–5, 4.11.6/26; DL 7.104–5; Handbook 1.1, 2, 32.2.48.3; Stob. 2.7.10b.]
15 ἐκτός ektos ‘external’; ta ektos, ‘the externals’, are any of those things that fall outside the preserve of one’s prohairesis, including health, wealth, sickness, life, death, pain – what Epictetus calls the aprohaireta, which are not in our power, the ‘indifferent’ things. [See Discourses 1.15.2, 1.27.11, 2.2.10–15/25–6, 2.5.4–9/24, 2.16.11, 2.22.19, 3.3.8, 3.7.2, 3.10.16, 3.12.6, 3.15.13, 3.24.56, 4.3.1, 4.4.1–6, 4.7.10/41, 4.8.32, 4.10.1,4.12.15; DL 7.95/106; Handbook 13, 23, 29.7, 33.13, 48.1; Stob. 2.7.5e/7a–b/11c.]
16 ἐλευθερία eleutheria ‘freedom’, a state of being, constitutive of the eudaimôn life, enjoyed by the Stoic wise person in virtue of their capacity to maintain their prohairesis in the right condition. In making the correct use of impressions and not assenting to false judgements, the Stoic wise person is free from disturbing emotions, and so can never be constrained or impeded by external events or the actions of other people. Those who are free are ‘eleutheros’. The person who is free is said by Epictetus to be the ‘friend of God’Discourses 4.3.9). [See Discourses 1.12.8–15, 2.1.21–8, 2.2.13, 2.17.29, 3.5.7, 3.7.27, 3.13.11, 3.15.12, 3.22.16/39/42–4/84, 3.24.66–7/96–8, 3.26.34–5/39, 4.1, 4.3.7/9, 4.6.8–9/16–17, 4.7.8–9, 4.13.24; Handbook 1.2–4, 14.2.19.2, 29.7; Stob. 2.7.11i/11m.]
17 ἐφ' ἡμῖν eph’ hêmin ‘in our power’, ‘up to us’, or ‘depending on us’; namely, making the correct use of impressions, by means of which we maintain our prohairesis in the right condition. This is the most important concept in Epictetus’ treatment of Stoic ethics. [See Discourses 1.1, 1.6.40, 1.12.32–4, 1.18.12, 1.22.9–10, 1.29.8, 2.1.12, 2.2.6, 2.5.4/8, 2.13.1–2/10–11, 2.13.32, 3.3.10, 3.24.1–3/22–3, 3.26.34, 4.1.65–83/100/128–31, 4.4.15, 4.7.8–10, 4.10.8/28; Handbook 1.1–2/5, 2.1–2.14.1–2.18,19.1–2, 24.1–2, 25.1, 31.2.32.1–2.48.3.]
18 ἐπιθυμία epithumia ‘desire’, ‘appetite’ or ‘yearning’; one of the four primary pathê (passions). Epithumia is the yearning that the non-wise person directs towards anticipated events and objects in the mistaken belief that they are of real benefit. [See DL 7.110/113; Stob. 2.7.10/10b.]
19 εὐδαίμων eudaimôn ‘happy’ or ‘flourishing’; descriptive of the sophos (Stoic wise person). See eudaimonia.
20 εὐδαιμονία eudaimonia ‘happiness’, ‘flourishing’ or ‘living well’ was conceived by the ancient philosophers as the telos, ‘end’ or ‘goal’ of life. For Epictetus, one achieves this end, of living the eudaimôn (‘happy’) life, by learning the correct use of impressions, following God, and following nature. More generally, the Stoics say that happiness consists in living virtuously (DL 7.87/89). Zeno said that happiness is ‘a good flow of life’ (DL 7.88, Stob. 2.7.6e) attained by ‘living in agreement’ (Stob. 2.7.6a). Someone who enjoys eudaimonia is eudaimôn. See euroia biou; telos. [See Discourses 1.4.3, 2.4.9, 3.20.15, 3.22.26–30/39/60/84, 3.23.34, 3.24.2/16–17/52/118, 3.26.18, 4.1.46, 4.4.36/48, 4.7.9, 4.8.30–1; DL 7.88/89/95/97/104/128; Handbook 1.4; LS 63; Stob. 2.7.5b5/5g/6c-e/7g/8a/11g.]
21 εὐλάβεια eulabeia ‘caution’; one of the three eupatheiai (‘good feelings’), experienced only by the Stoic wise person. [See Discourses 2.1, 2.2.14; DL 7.116; Handbook 48.1.]
22 εὐπάθεια eupatheia ‘good feeling’; possessed by the Stoic wise person (sophos) who experiences these special sorts of emotions, but does not experience irrational and disturbing passions. There are three eupatheiai experienced by the Stoic wise person: (1) with respect to an anticipated good, whereas the non-wise person experiences epithumia (desire), the wise person experiences boulêsis (wish); (2) with respect to the presence of a supposed good, whereas the non-wise person experiences hêdonê (pleasure), the wise person experiences chara (joy); and (3) with respect to an anticipated evil, whereas the non-wise person experiences phobos (fear), the wise person experiences eulabeia (caution). There is no ‘good feeling’ that correlates with the non-wise person’s experience of lupê (distress) with respect to the presence of a supposed evil. A ‘good feeling’ correlates with a correct judgement (and possibly is the affective component of such a judgement) about what is truly good (virtue, and action motivated by virtue), in contrast to a passion which correlates with a false judgement. See pathos. [See DL 7.116 = LS 65F.]
23 εὔροια βιοῦ euroia biou ‘good flow of life’; this is Zeno’s definition of eudaimonia (‘happiness’), enjoyed by the sophos (wise person). Epictetus usually uses the abbreviated form, hê euroia. In Handbook 8 he uses the verb euroeô which means ‘to flow well’, translated as ‘all being well’. Other translators deploy a range of suitably synonymous expressions: peace of mind, peace, happiness, serenity, tranquillity, well-being, prosperity. See also eudaimonia, telos. [See Discourses 1.1.22, 1.4.1–5/27–8, 2.16.41/47, 2.18.28, 2.19.29, 3.10.10, 3.14.8, 3.17.9, 3.20.14, 3.22.26/39/45, 4.4.4–5/22/37/39, 4.6.35, 4.7.9, 4.12.2; MA 2.5, 5.34, 10.6; Handbook 8; Stob. 2.7.6e/8a.]
24 εὐσεβής eusebês ‘dutiful’ or ‘pious’; the disposition of someone who takes proper care of their devotion to the gods. [See Discourses 3.2.4, 4.7.9; Handbook 31.4; Stob. 2.7.11g.]
25 ἡδονή hêdonê ‘pleasure’; one of the four primary pathê (passions). Hêdonê is the pleasure that the non-wise person experiences when events or objects that are mistakenly believed to be of real value are present. See pathos. [See Discourses 2.11.19–22, 3.7.2–18, 3.12.7, 3.24.36–7/71–2; DL 7.85–6/93/103/110/114/117; Ep. 51.5–6, 59.1–2, 104.34; Handbook 34; Stob. 2.7.5a/10/10b–c.]
26 ἡγεμόνικον hêgemonikon ‘commanding faculty’, the controlling part of the soul (psuchê); the centre of consciousness, the seat of all mental states, thought by the Stoics (and some other ancients) to be located in the heart. It manifests four mental powers: the capacity to receive impressions, to assent to them, form intentions to act in response to them, and to do these things rationally. The Discourses and Handbook talk of keeping the prohairesis in the right condition, and also of keeping the hêgemonikon in the right condition, and for Epictetus these notions are essentially interchangeable. The prohairesis and the hêgemonikon are in the right condition when they are maintained ‘in accordance with nature’ or ‘in harmony with nature’. [See Discourses 1.15.4, 1.20.11, 1.26.15, 2.1.39, 2.18.8–9/30, 2.22.25, 2.26.7, 3.3.1, 3.4.9, 3.5.3, 3.6.3, 3.9.11, 3.10.11/16, 3.15.13, 3.21.3, 3.22.19/33/93, 4.4.43, 4.5.4/6, 4.7.40, 4.10.25; Handbook 29.7, 38; LS 53H/K2; Stob. 2.7.5b7/10.]
27 ὁρμή hormê ‘impulse to act’, ‘choice’ or ‘intention’ (more appropriately translated as ‘preference’ at Handbook 48.3); that which motivates an action. ‘Impulse is a motion of the soul towards something’ (Stob. 2.7.9 = LS 53Q2). ‘Impulse is the stimulus to action’ (Cicero, On Duties 1.132 = LS 53J). Its opposite, repulsion, ‘a motion of the soul away from something’, is aphormê. [See Discourses 1.1.12, 1.4.11, 2.24.19, 3.2.2, 3.7.26/34, 3.12.4/13, 3.22.31/36/43/104, 3.24.56, 4.1.1/71–3, 4.4.16–18/28, 4.6.18, 4.7.20, 4.11.6/26; DL 7.85–6/108; Handbook 1.1, 2.2, 48.3; Stob. 2.7.5b3/5b5/5b13/5c/5o/7/7a/7c/7e/9/9a–b/10.]
28 ὑπεξαίρεσις hupexhairesis ‘reservation’; the Stoic wise person undertakes all actions ‘with reservation’, recognising that the outcomes of all actions are not ‘in their power’, for only the intention to act, and to act with virtue, are in their power. Thus, in undertaking any action, the Stoic wise person understands that they will succeed in their action unless something intervenes, and if something does intervene, this is accepted as how Zeus wants the world to be, and is not an occasion for feeling upset and lapsing into passion. [See Handbook 2.2; MA 4.1, 5.20, 6.50, 8.41, 11.37 = Fragment 27; Seneca, On Benefits 4.34.4, Tranquillity of Mind 13.2–3; Stob. 2.7.11s = LS 65W.]
29 ὑπόλειψις hupolêpsis ‘opinion’ or ‘assumption’; the Stoic prokoptôn guards against holding inappropriate or false opinions – something that occurs if they do not make ‘proper use of impressions’. The opinions we hold are ‘in our power’; thus maintaining one’s prohairesis in the right condition is in part accomplished by holding appropriate opinions. [See Handbook 1.1, 20, 31.1; Stob. 2.7.10.]
30 ἰδιώτης idiôtês a common, private, or uneducated person. Epictetus uses this term to denote someone who is ignorant of philosophy (in particular, Stoic ethics), and who is in this sense uneducated. An idiôtês is idiôtikos (‘uneducated’). In Handbook 5 Epictetus also uses the term apaideutos, ‘uneducated’, and it is from this condition of being uneducated that the Stoic philosophos tries to save themselves (the achievement of which would be to attain eudaimonia), undertaken by maintaining one’s prohairesis in the right condition, following God, following nature, and above all by making the proper use of impressions. The Stobaeus text employs the term phaulos (‘worthless’; ‘inferior’ in LS) which, in this context can be regarded as a synonym of Epictetus’ idiôtês. [See Discourses 1.29.64–6, 2.12.2–4/10–11, 3.16, 3.22.87; Fragment 2; Handbook 5, 17, 29.7, 33.6/13/15, 46, 48.1, 51.1; Stob. 2.7.5b10/5b12–13/5e/6c/11b/11d/11g/11i–k/11m/11s.]
31 ἰδιοτισμός idiôtismos the way or manner of the idiôtês, the common, private, or uneducated person (more appropriately translated as ‘vulgar’ at Handbook 33.15). [See Handbook 33.6/15.]
32 κακία kakia ‘vice’; characteristic of the idiôtês, but alien to the sophos. Vicious actions inevitably befall the agent who makes false judgements about what is really good and bad, and about what constitutes the telos and the eudaimôn life. Thus, from the perspective of Stoic ethics, all, or almost all people are vicious, being phaulos (worthless), idiôtikos and apaideutos (uneducated). The prokoptôn is aware of their deficiencies and turns to Stoic ethics for philosophical enlightenment and practical remedies that will require commitment to Stoic training (askêsis). [See DL 7.93/95–7/102/120; LS 61; Stob. 2.7.5a–b/5b1/5b8–10/5b12–13/5c/5e–g/6d/6f/7/11d/11f–g/11k–m.]
33 καλός kalos ‘fine’, ‘beautiful, ‘honourable’ (more appropriately ‘proper’ in Handbook 2.2); Epictetus describes the Stoic sophos as kalos kai agathos, ‘fine and good’. See sophos. [See Discourses 1.7.2, 1.12.7, 2.10.5, 2.11.25, 2.14.10, 3.2.1/7, 3.3.1, 3.22.69/87, 3.24.18/50/95/110, 4.5.1/6, 4.8.24; DL 7.101; Handbook 2.2, 6, 10; Stob. 2.7.5d/6e/11g–h/11k/11s.]
34 κακός kakos ‘bad’, ‘evil’ (more appropriately ‘fault’ in Handbook 33.9); the only thing that counts as truly bad for the Stoic philosophos is kakia, ‘vice’ (whereas things commonly understood to be bad are regarded as adiaphoros, ‘indifferent’, by Stoics). [See Discourses 2.1.4, 3.3.1–4, 3.20.1–4, 3.22.23, 3.24.1–3, 4.10.8, 4.12.7–8/19–21; Handbook 11, 12, 16, 24, 27.7, 30, 31.2, 32.1, 33.9, 53.1; LS 60; Stob. 2.7.5a–b/5b1/5c–g/6d–e/7/10/10b–c/11g/11i.]
35 κατὰ φύσιν kata phusin ‘in accordance with nature’; the Stoic prokoptôn endeavours to maintain their prohairesis ‘in accordance with nature’, accomplished by making proper use of impressions, following God, and making manifest in their life the conviction that virtue is the proper telos (‘end’ or ‘goal’) for all rational beings. Thus to live in accordance with nature is one and the same as securing the eudaimôn life. That which is not in accordance with nature is contrary to nature, para phusin, and ‘natural things’ are ta kata phusin. (Epictetus also uses a range of essentially synonymous expressions when he urges his students to ‘live in accordance with nature’, talking also of ‘following nature’, and ‘living in harmony or agreement (sumphônos) with nature’ – though the last expression occurs in only the Discourses and not in the Handbook.) [See Discourses 1.11.5/8, 1.12.19, 1.15.4, 1.21.2, 1.26.2, 3.3.1, 3.4.9,3.5.3, 3.6.3, 3.9.11/17, 3.10.11, 3.13.20, 3.16.15, 4.4.43, 4.5.5–6; DL 7.105; Handbook 4, 6, 13, 30.]
36 κάθηκον kathêkon any ‘appropriate action’, ‘proper function’, or ‘duty’ undertaken by someone aiming to do what befits them as a responsible, sociable person. The appropriate actions are the subject of the second of the three topoi. [See Discourses 1.7.1–2/21, 1.18.2, 1.22.15, 1.28.5, 2.7.1, 2.8.29, 2.10, 2.14.18, 2.17.15/31, 3.2.2/4, 3.7.24–8, 3.22.43/69/74, 4.4.16, 4.12.16; DL 7.25/93/107–10/118; Handbook 30, 33.13, 42; LS 59; Stob. 2.7.5b2–3/5b9/6a/7b/8/8a/9/10b/11a.]
37 κατόρθωμα katorthôma a ‘right action’ or ‘complete or perfect action’ undertaken by the Stoic sophos, constituted by an appropriate action performed virtuously. [See LS 59K–O; Stob. 2.7.8/8a/11a/11e/11l/11o.]
38 λύπη lupê ‘distress’; one of the four primary pathê (passions). Lupê is the distress that the non-wise person experiences when events or objects that are mistakenly believed to be of real harm are present. Some translators, including Pomeroy 1999 (Stob.) use the term ‘pain’ for lupê, and it is important to stress that in Stoic philosophy of mind, lupê denotes mental pain, what someone suffers whilst in the grip of this passion (see Garrett 1999). [See Discourses 3.13.11, 3.22.48, 4.1.84, 4.3.7, 4.6.8; DL 7.96/110–12/118; Stob. 2.7.5b/5c/5g/10/10a–c/11i.]
39 ὄρεξις orexis ‘desire’; properly directed only at virtue, a type of ‘rational impulse’ constituted by a movement of the soul towards something. Epictetus says that we should exercise desire and aversion ‘in accordance with nature’ (Discourses 1.21.1). See hormê. [See Discourses 1.1.12, 1.4.1/11, 2.24.19, 3.2.1–3, 3.3.2, 3.6.6, 3.9.22, 3.12, 3.13.21, 3.14.10, 3.22.13/31/36/43, 3.23.9, 3.24.54, 3.26.14, 4.1.84, 4.4.28, 4.5.27, 4.6.18, 4.8.20, 4.11.6/26; Handbook 1.1, 2.1–2.14.1, 15, 31.4, 32.2, 48.3; Stob. 2.7.9/11f.]
40 πάθος pathos ‘passion’; any of the ‘disturbing or violent emotions’ experienced inappropriately and sometimes excessively by those who lack Stoic wisdom and believe that externals really are good or bad, when in fact they are ‘indifferent’. (The term pathos does not occur in the Handbook, and it occurs only sparsely in the Discourses, though terms which describe someone’s experience of falling into disturbing passions abound, and these include being miserable, distressed, hindered, impeded, unfortunate, irritated, and wretched.) A pathos, according to the Stoics, is an excessive impulse occasioned by assenting to a false judgement based on amisunderstanding of what is truly good and bad, and can be regarded as the affective component of such a judgement, or can be identified as the judgement itself (DL 7.111; LS 65G3). When you have a pathos you are said to have an ‘irrational and unnatural movement of the soul’ (DL 7.110). The Stoics identified four primary pathê, two directed at what we expect to happen, epithumia (desire) and phobos (fear), and two directed at present circumstances, hêdonê (pleasure) and lupê (distress): thus what we first longed for, we take delight in once we have it, and what we first feared becomes the source of anguish when we the time comes to suffer it. Other passions are classified under these four primary passions. Anger, sexual desire, and love of riches, for instance, are types of desire (Stob. 2.7.10b = LS 65E). The Stoic sophos does not experience these pathê, but does experience the eupatheiai, ‘good feelings’. The Stoic prokoptôn endeavours to make the transition from idiôtês, whose life is circumscribed by the pathê, to sophos, who is entirely free from the pathê – and in this sense they strive to eradicate or extirpate the passions; though, one cannot directly extirpate a passion that one is already suffering any more than one can prevent sugar from tasting sweet (for instance) once the slice of cake is already in one’s mouth. The Stoic sophos simply stops experiencing the pathê because they no longer make false judgements about what is good and bad, and about what constitutes the telos and the eudaimôn life. Thus, the prokoptôn strives not to eradicate the pathê directly, but to guard against making false judgements, which occurs, for Epictetus, when one fails to make proper use of impressions. See also agathos, apatheia, ektos,
eupatheia. [See Discourses 1.27.10; 3.2.3, 4.1.115, 4.3.7, 4.6.16; DL 7.110–16; LS 65; Stob. 2.7.6d/10/10a–10e.]
41 πεπρωμένη Peprômenê ‘fate’ or ‘destiny’, conceived of as one’s appointed lot in life. The key feature of fate is its anankê (necessity or compulsion). The training that the Stoic prokoptôn engages in, if successful, will result in their embracing their own fate, and that of the world generally, as wholly acceptable and even desirable, no matter what its character may be. [See Discourses 2.23.42, 3.22.95, 4.1.128–31, 4.4.34, 4.7.20; DL 7.149; Handbook 53.]
42 φαντασία phantasia ‘impression’; phantasiai are what we are aware of in virtue of having experiences. They are not limited only to what is sensed in perception, but include as well what we are aware of when thinking abstractly, having memories, imaging things, and so forth. An impression is an ‘imprint on the soul: the name having been appropriately borrowed from the imprint made by the seal upon the wax’ (DL 7.45, trans. Hicks), and this notion of what an impression is, we must suppose, derives from Plato’s account in the Theaetetus (191c–e) of the mind being compared to a block of wax that when impressed by perceptions or ideas, retains and remembers them for as long as the impression lasts. Whereas non-rational animals respond to their impressions automatically (thus ‘using’ them), over and above using our impressions, human beings, being rational, can ‘understand their use’ (Discourses 1.6.13, 2.14.15) and, with practice, assent or not assent to them as we deem appropriate. ‘The use of impressions’ (hê chrêsis tôn phantasiôn) in this wider sense is an essential component of making progress, and it is this capacity that Epictetus strives to teach his students.
See also prokopê, sunkatathesis. [See Discourses 1.1.7/12, 1.3.4, 1.6.13, 1.12.34, 1.20.5/7/15, 1.27.1–2, 1.28.10–12/30–3, 1.30.4, 2.1.4, 2.8.4/6, 2.14.15–16, 2.18.8–29, 2.19.32, 2.22.5–6, 2.23.7/40/42, 3.2.5/8, 3.3.1/17/20, 3.8, 3.12.6–15, 3.16.15, 3.22.25/43/103, 3.24.69/88/108, 3.25.6, 3.26.13–14, 4.1.74, 4.3.7, 4.4.13–14, 4.5.23, 4.6.25/34, 4.7.32, 4.10.26; DL 7.45–6/49–51, 7.118; Handbook 1.5, 6, 10, 16, 18, 19, 20, 34, 45; LS 39A (= DL 7.49–51), 62K (= Discourses 1.1.7–12); Stob. 2.7.5l/7a–b/9/10c.]
43 φιλοσοφία philosophia ‘philosophy’; literally, the ‘love of wisdom’, the discipline in which, as a Stoic, one immerses oneself in the pursuit of eudaimonia. [See Discourses 1.15.1–4, 1.26.15, 2.11.1, 3.10.6–7, 3.12.12, 3.13.23, 3.14.10, 3.15.12, 3.24.81, 3.26.13, 4.1.113, 4.8.9/18/34–6, 4.11.22–5; Handbook 22, 52.1; Stob. 2.7.11k/11m.]
44 φιλόσοφος philosophos ‘philosopher’; literally, one who ‘loves wisdom’, in Stoicism the person for whom Stoic philosophy is a way of life, a way of engaging in affairs in which one aims to flourish as fully as one may in the pursuit of eudaimonia. The Stobaeus text employs the term spoudaios (‘worthwhile’; ‘virtuous’ in LS) which, in this context can be regarded as a synonym of Epictetus’ philosophos. [See Discourses 1.1.25, 1.2.26/29, 1.4.1, 1.8.11–14, 1.9.1, 1.11.28, 1.18.1–2, 1.20.7, 2.9.13, 2.14.7–9/11, 2.17.1–3/30–1, 2.24.29, 3.7.1, 3.8.7, 3.9.11, 3.13.11, 3.15.10, 3.19.1, 3.24.31, 3.26.7/35–6, 4.1.83/132–43, 4.4.18, 4.6.12/33, 4.7.24/32, 4.8.4–23, 4.8.9/17–20; Handbook 22, 23, 29.3–4/7, 32.1, 46.1, 48.1, 49; Stob. 2.7.5b8/5b11/5k–l/6c/11b/11d/11g/11i–k/11m/11p–q/11s.]
45 φόβος phobos ‘fear’; one of the four primary pathê (passions). Phobos is the fear that the non-wise person directs towards anticipated events or objects in the mistaken belief that they are of real harm. [See DL 7.110/112; Stob. 2,7.5b–c/5g/10/10b–c.]
46 φύσις phusis ‘nature’; literally ‘growth’, the totality of everything, including the cosmic forces and principles that create and sustain all things. Depending upon our point of view and the emphasis we wish to make, phusis is also God, providence, fate; and also logos, for the world is wholly rational because God brings about events according to His necessarily good purposes. Each individual thing has its own phusis, its own way of growing, behaving, and flourishing according to what is usual and beneficial for the species of thing it happens to be. Thus, for example, it is natural for cows to eat grass, but contrary to the nature of a person to do so. Such specific differences and variations in the natures of different types of thing is accounted for by the way in which God, conceived as active matter, blends with the passive material universe, shaping matter into the diverse forms of which we are aware. Phusis is the supreme organising and creative principle which brings about the phusis possessed by each individual entity. Stoics hold that the rationality of Zeus/phusis/logos is manifest in each human being taken to be (literally) a fragment of God, for everyone has the capacity to reason, and this being the case, everyone has the potential to understand in what the good life consists (eudaimonia) and how to attain it. For the Stoics, to acquire eudaimonia one must ‘follow nature’, ‘live in accordance with nature’, or ‘live in harmony with nature’ – these are all essentially synonymous expressions –which means both (1) accepting our own fate and the fate of the world, as well as understanding what it means to be a rational being, and striving for virtue by means of which we maintain our prohairesis in the right condition, and (2) doing what is appropriate for the type of creature that we happen to be, which for human beings includes doing what is required with respect to one’s social roles: to live in accordance with nature, a mother for example must care for her child, and a judge must dispense justice wisely and impartially. See aretê, hêgemonikon, and theos. [See Discourses 1.2.6, 1.4.14–15/18/29, 1.6.15/21, 1.9.9, 1.11.5/8, 1.12.19, 1.15.4, 1.16.4, 1.17.18, 1.19.25, 1.20.5, 1.21.2, 1.22.9, 1.26.2, 2.5.24, 2.6.9, 2.11.6, 2.13.11, 2.14.22, 2.20.15, 2.23.42, 2.24.12/19/101–2, 3.1.3/30, 3.4.9, 3.5.3, 3.6.3–4, 3.7.28, 3.9.11/17, 3.10.11, 3.13.20, 3.16.15, 3.23.12, 3.24.1/102, 4.1.121/125, 4.4.14/28/43, 4.5.5–6, 4.8.40, 4.10.8/26, 4.12.2; DL 7.87–9/105/108/147–9/156–7; Handbook 1.2–3, 2.4, 6, 13, 26, 27, 30, 48.3, 49; Stob. 2.7.5b3/5b5/5m/6/6e/7a–f/8/8a/10/10a/10e/11i.]
47 πιστός pistos ‘trustworthy’, of someone possessing pistis, trustworthiness; for Epictetus, a key characteristic of the prokoptôn’s prohairesis. See also aidêmôn. [See Discourses 1.3.4, 2.2.4, 2.4.1–2, 2.14.13, 4.5.14, 4.13.19–20; Stob. 2.7.11m; for pistos together with aidêmôn, see Discourses 1.4.18–20, 1.25.4, 1.28.20–1/23, 2.4.2, 2.8.23, 2.10.22–3/29, 2.22.20/30, 3.3.9–10, 3.7.36, 3.13.3, 3.14.13, 3.17.3, 3.23.18, 4.1.161, 4.3.7, 4.9.17, 4.13.13/15; Handbook 24.3–5.]
48 προήγμενος proêgmenos ‘preferred’; used of adiaphoros (‘indifferent’) things, conventionally taken to be good and advantageous, including such things as health and wealth, taking pleasure in the company of others, and so forth. Enjoying any of the preferred indifferents is not in itself constitutive of the eudaimôn life sought by the Stoic prokoptôn. See also apoproêgmenos. [See DL 7.102/105–7; LS 58E–F, Stob. 2.7.7b/7f–g.]
49 προαίρεσις prohairesis ‘moral character’; the capacity that rational beings have for making choices and intending the outcomes of their actions, sometimes translated as will, volition, intention, choice, moral choice, moral purpose. This faculty is understood by Stoics to be essentially rational. It is the faculty we use to ‘attend to impressions’ and to give (or withhold) assent to impressions. Those things which are outside the scope of one’s prohairesis are the aprohaireta, which are aprohairetos and ‘external’ (ektos), and ‘not in our power’ (ouk eph’ hêmin); see Discourses 1.30.3, 2.16.1, 3.3.14, 3.8.1–3. See also hêgemonikon, sunkatathesis. [See Discourses 1.1.23, 1.4.18–21, 1.8.16, 1.12.9, 1.17.21/23/26, 1.19.8/16/23, 1.22.10, 1.29.1–3/12/24, 1.30.3, 2.1.4–6/9–10/12/39–40, 2.5.4–5, 2.6.25, 2.10.8/24–9, 2.13.10, 2.15.1, 2.16.1, 2.22.20/26–9, 2.23.5–29, 3.1.40/42, 3.2.13, 3.3.8/14–19, 3.4.9, 3.5.7, 3.7.5, 3.8.1–3, 3.10.18, 3.12.5/8, 3.16.15, 3.19.2, 3.22.13/103, 3.23.5, 3.24.12/56/106/112, 3.26.24, 4.1.84/100, 4.4.18/23/33/39, 4.5.12/23/32, 4.6.9–10, 4.7.8, 4.10.1–2/8, 4.12.7/12/15, 4.13.21; Handbook 4, 9, 13, 30.]
50 προκοπή prokopê ‘progress’; what the Stoic prokoptôn tries to maintain by applying the principles of Stoic ethics, by living virtuously and, in particular for Epictetus, by ‘following nature’, ‘following God’, and making ‘proper use of impressions’. [See Discourses 1.4.1–21, 3.2.5, 3.8.4, 3.19.3, 4.2.4–5; DL 7.91; Ep. 75.8–18; Handbook 12.1, 13.1, 51.2–3; Stob. 2.7.7b.]
51 προκόπτω prokoptô to make progress.
52 πρόκοπτον prokoptôn ‘one who is making progress (prokopê)’ in living as a Stoic, which for Epictetus means above all learning the ‘correct use of impressions’. See phantasia. [See Handbook 48.2, 51.2.]
53 σοφός sophos the Stoic ‘wise person’ or ‘Sage’, who values only aretê and enjoys a eudaimôn life. The sophos enjoys a way of engaging in life that the prokoptôn strives to emulate and attain. The philosophos (philosopher), in contrast to the idiôtês (‘uneducated person’), is someone who has taken up the training that is required to make progress (prokopê) towards the condition enjoyed by the sophos. Epictetus also refers to such a person as phronimos, ‘wise’ (Discourses 2.21.9, 2.22.3, 3.22.37, 4.1.92), as spoudaios, ‘good’ (Discourses 1.7.3/29, 3.6.5) and as kalos kai agathos, ‘fine and good’ (Discourses 1.7.2, 1.12.7, 1.23.3, 2.10.5, 2.11.25, 2.14.10, 2.21.11, 3.2.1/7, 3.3.1, 3.22.69/87, 3.24.18/50/95/110, 4.5.1, 4.8.24; see also Stob. 2.7.11g/11s). See also philosophos, philosophia, prokopê, prokoptôn. [See Discourses 3.13.22, 3.22.67, 4.1.6; DL 7.94/117–25; Handbook 53.2; Stob. 2.7.5b8/5b10–12/11b/11k/11m–n/11s.]
54 συγκατάθεσις sunkatathesis ‘assent’ (noun); a capacity of the prohairesis to judge the significance of impressions. It is because we are prone to making incorrect judgements that eudaimonia eludes us and we are vulnerable to the pathê (passions) under whose influence we lapse into vice. See also pathos, phantasia. [See Discourses 1.17.22–3 1.18.1, 1.28.1, 2.17.5, 3.2.2, 3.7.15, 3.12.14/104, 3.22.42–3, 4.1.69, 4.4.13, 4.6.12/26, 4.10.2, 4.11.6; DL 7.91; Handbook 45; Stob. 2.7.7b/9b/11m.]
55 ταραχή tarachê ‘distress’, ‘disturbance’, ‘trouble’; what one avoids when one enjoys ataraxia. [See Handbook 1.3, 3, 5, 12, 28.]
56 τέλος telos ‘end’ or ‘goal’; that which we pursue for its own sake and not for the sake of any other thing. The Stoics accepted the traditional conception of the telos being eudaimonia (‘happiness’ or ‘flourishing’), but argued that this consists solely in aretê (moral excellence); the telos, then, can be attained by ‘living in accordance with virtue’ (Stob. 2.7.6e). Epictetus formulates the end in several different but closely related ways. He says that the end is to maintain one’s prohairesis in proper order, to follow God, follow nature, live in accordance with nature, or live in harmony with nature – all of which count as maintaining a eudaimôn life. The means by which this is to be accomplished is to apply oneself assiduously to the ‘three topoi’. The earlier Stoics defined the end in a range of related ways: Zeno says it is ‘Living in agreement’; Cleanthes added to this, saying it is ‘Living in agreement with nature’; Chrysippus defined it as ‘Living in accord with our experience of what happens naturally’ (see LS 63B); Diogenes of Babylon says that the end is ‘Being circumspect in selecting and rejecting the things in accordance with nature’; Archedemus says it is ‘Living so as to complete everything that is appropriate’; and Antipater says it is ‘Living so as always to select what is in accordance with nature whilst rejecting what is contrary to nature’ (see Stob. 2.7.6a/6e). [See Discourses 1.12.5, 1.20.15, 1.30.4, 4.7.20; DL 7.87–9/96–7; LS 63; Stob. 2.7.5b3/5b5/5k/6a–c/6e.]
57 θεός theos ‘God’, who is material, is a sort of fiery breath that blends with undifferentiated matter to create the forms that we find in the world around us. He is supremely rational, and despite our feelings to the contrary, makes the best world that it is possible to make. How we understand and relate to God is of central concern to Epictetus. God is characterised as (a) omniscient (Discourses 1.14.9–10); (b) the father of everyone (we all are ‘sons of Zeus’ ;1.3.1–2, 1.9.6, 1.13.3–4, 1.19.12), (c) who has made everyone to be happy (eudaimôn) and to enjoy peace of mind (eustatheia ;3.24.2), (d) who (as a matter of fact) protects us and cares for us (1.17.27, 3.24.3), and (e) can be actively called upon to protect us (2.18.29), (f) who has given us what we need, including the virtues and the faculty of making proper use of impressions (1.1.12, 1.6.28–9, 1.25.3, 1.29.3–4, 2.16.13–14, 2.23.6–9, 3.24.3, 4.1.100, 4.5.34), and (g) who is wholly providential (1.16, 2.14.11, 2.23.2–4, 3.17). The Stoic’s relationship to God is characterised by their (h) regarding God as their benevolent creator and friend (1.16, 3.26.28/37); (i) being a friend to God (4.3.9, 3.24.60); (j) not blaming God for misfortunes or hardships (1.14.16, 3.10.13, 3.22.13/48, 3.24.58, 4.7.9); (k) endeavouring to do God’s will, to obey Him and please Him (2.6.9–10, 2.7.13, 2.16.42, 3.1.37, 3.24.110, 4.1.99, 4.3.9, 4.12.11), to ‘follow God’ and accept the fate that He bestows on them and on the world (1.12.1–7, 1.20.15, 1.30.4, 4.7.20; Handbook 53.1–3); (l) showing reverence to and being thankful to God (1.4.32, 2.23.5, 3.7.26, 4.4.18, 4.7.9); (m) understanding that everyone is literally a part (meros) or fragment (apospasma) of God (1.14.6, 1.17.27, 2.8.10–14, Ep. 31.11), that they share His reason (1.9.5) and strive to join His fellowship (koinônia) (2.19.27); (n) serving in the post assigned to them by God (1.9.16/24, 1.16.21, 3.22.69, 3.24.99; Handbook 22); (o) bearing witness to God’s work and their own capacities (1.29.46–9, 3.24.112–13, 3.26.28, 4.8.31); (p) singing praises to God (3.26.29–30); and (q) imitating God (2.14.11–13). God is a frequent topic throughout the Discourses; for God as ‘the Giver’, see 4.1.103–7, 4.4.47, 4.10.14–16, Handbook 11; for arguments for the existence of God see 1.6.1–11 and 2.14.25–8. See also Zeus. [See Discourses 2.23.42; DL 7.119/124/134–9/147–8; Handbook 1.3, 15, 22, 29.2, 31.1/4–5, 32.2, 53.1/3; LS 46/54A–B, Stob. 2.7.5b2/5b12/10c/11g/11k/11s.]
58 τόποι topoi ‘topics’. The ‘three topics’ or ‘fields of study’ which we find elucidated in the Discourses is an original feature of Epictetus’ educational programme. The three fields of study are: (1) The Discipline of Desire, concerned with desire and aversion (orexis and ekklisis), and what is really good and desirable (virtue, using impressions properly, following God, and following nature); (2) The Discipline of Action, concerned with impulse and repulsion (hormê and aphormê), and our ‘appropriate actions’ or ‘duties’ (see kathêkon) with respect to living in our communities in ways that befit a rational being; and (3) The Discipline of Assent (see sunkatathesis), concerned with how we should judge our impressions so as not to be carried away by them into anxiety or disturbing emotions with the likelihood of failing in the first two Disciplines. [See Discourses 1.4.11, 1.17.20–6, 1.21.1–2, 2.8.29, 2.17.14–18, 2.24.19–20, 3.2.1–6, 3.12.8–15, 3.26.14, 4.4.13, 4.6.26, 4.10.13, 4.11.6; Ep. 89.14–15; MA 7.54, 8.7, 9.6.]
59 Ζεύς Zeus the name for God; Epictetus uses the terms ‘Zeus’, ‘God’, and ‘the gods’ interchangeably. The Stoics also identify Zeus with nature, fate, and providence, conceived of as the rational and inevitable coming about of all events that by being located just as they happen to be, within the nexus of causation, constitute the entire history of the universe. See also theos. [See DL 7.88; Handbook 53.1.]